The developments which are now taking place show that Asian states are increasingly negating the IIAs (in the form of BITs or PTAs) which form a dense network of obligations. Although few cases had been brought against Asian states by 2009, the pattern has changed since 2010, with a sharp increase in the initiation of investor-state arbitration proceedings over the last three years. Although some IIAs have generated a few disputes for technical reasons (for example, those concluded by China before 2005 or by Thailand, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, which require the pre-approval of investments), it is rather predictable that Asian states are currently entering an era in which foreign investors are likely to multiply claims. Such a trend requires host states to be prepared to litigate while reassessing the economic and political benefits of current investment treaty commitments.
Introduction
International investment law and policy have undergone profound transformations since the mid1990s. The period since NAFTA's 1 coming into force has witnessed a literal explosion in the number of international investment agreements (IIAs), in the form of both BITs and PTAs involving all states which were earlier part of the Soviet Union.
2 Primarily North-South in character at the outset, this phenomenon has also registered an important mutation in the 2000s, with an ever-growing number of South-South and South-North IIAs characterizing the evolution of emerging economies. It has been during the last decade that many Asian states, with China, India, and Korea being the most active, developed and reinforced their network of IIAs, thereby making investment a key aspect of their economic pacts with third states.
While not all countries and stakeholders share similar expectations of investment treaties application, 3 the present article contributes to the study and understanding of the evolving international regime for investment in Asia at a crucial time. The Asian regime for investment is not static but, on the contrary, very dynamic. 4 It continues to grow and change, and it will be affected by various factors in the coming months and years which relate to the rise of some new actors; these include the likely increase of litigation in Asia, the regionalization of investment rule-making (illustrated by the Transpacific partnership (TPP)) and the rise of EU as an FDI negotiator. Firstly, the last decade has witnessed an exponential surge of investment disputes between foreign investors and host country governments. 5 Arbitral panels have been charged with the task of applying the rules of IIAs in specific cases, a task often not straightforward, 3 As explained by Ryan, "International investment law developed rapidly over the past thirty years to meet the expectations of a diverse constituency -developed (i.e., capital-exporting) countries, developing (i.e., capitalimporting) countries, and private investors. While aligned in their desire to create a stable framework for international investment, each of these groups brings unique expectations and demands to the system." 5 The cumulative number of treaty-based cases had risen to more than 400 by 2013, with more than 200 brought before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Few disputes, however, involve Asian parties. However, as this paper will explain, the picture is likely to change in the near future by reason of the multiplication of Asian IIAs combined with a greater knowledge and practice (in both public and private circles) of investment rules. In any event, many lessons can be drawn for disputes and cases involving non-Asian claimants and countries; that is why the case law will be a major component in the current paper.
given the broad and sometimes ambiguous 6 terms of these arrangements. 7 This new phenomenon of investment litigation has brought about a number of decisions from different arbitral fora, contributing to the investment law regime by giving meaning to its provisions. Secondly, the TPP is a twenty-first-century preferential trade agreement (PTA) 8 to change PTAs by "multilateralising regionalism". 9 The TPP represents a major PTA which illustrates the regionalization of investment rule-making and probably represents a benchmark for the state of the art of international law of foreign investment. Thirdly, in the EU, in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon extended the Common Commercial Policy to be the second most important field of international economic relations, namely, foreign direct investment. The shift from the national to the supra-national level is in itself a major legal development -such an external dimension is relevant to Asian states because the EU, instead of one or all of the 27 EU members, will become their partner in future negotiations. 10 In this connection, the EU is likely to employ its significant bargaining power when negotiating IIAs to improve, for instance, the standards of investment protection or to develop new forms of all-encompassing agreements. This will affect the whole architecture of the international law of foreign investment.
The current analysis focuses on the litigation scenario involving Asian states 11 as defending parties; this has hitherto not been studied. 12 There is a wealth of information on various national Asian practices in treaty-making; 13 there is also a general analysis of the increasing role of international arbitration on investment matters but as yet no broad analysis of the participation of Asian states in investor-state arbitration. Such an analysis is however needed because investment disputes are a reliable indicator of the current compliance in the region with international norms, it simultaneously sheds light on domestic reforms undertaken to liberalize foreign investment. This paper intends to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of investment litigation against Asian states. The main thesis is that Asian states are currently entering an era in which foreign investors are likely to multiply claims which require host states to be prepared to litigate while assessing the benefits of the current investment treaties. 14 The current analysis first provides a macro-analysis of Asian rule-making. This section helps to understand what the key characteristics of the Asian IIAs (section 2) are. Once the relevant IIAs are identified, the paper will review the increasing share of investment disputes involving Asian states (Section 3). A holistic analysis of the Asian regime for investment will not be complete without a thorough analysis of international investment litigation involving Asian parties (Section 4). In the concluding section, lessons are drawn and prospects are sketched.
Revisiting the dynamics of investment rule-making in Asia
In terms of substance, Asian investment treaty practice (as are all other national treaty practices in this regard) shows that virtually all treaties listed above regulating foreign investment matters cover classic issues of international investment treaties. In this connection, the current paper does not detail these provisions (which are well known) but it simply refers to available publications. The following nine topics are classic issues of investment law: (1) definitions and scope of application; 15 (2) investment promotion and conditions for the entry of foreign investments and investors; 16 (3) general standards for the treatment of foreign investors and investments; 17 (4) issues of monetary transfers; 18 (5) expropriation (direct or indirect); 19 (6) operational and other conditions; 20 (7) losses from armed conflict or internal disorder; 21 (8) treaty exceptions, modifications, and terminations; 22 and (9) dispute settlement. 23 These diverse provisions are important to reassure foreign investors that they will be able to reap the benefits of their investment, and no trend denies such an approach, although evidence on the extent to which investment decisions are influenced by investment treaties is mixed. 24 To understand the dynamics of Asian rule-making in international investment requires knowledge of which are the international treaties (in the form of BITs or PTAs which have investment chapters) that involve at least one Asian country. If at least one Asian country has signed such an investment pact, the host economy is likely to be affected by foreign investment and, in any case, its domestic investment policy is subject to the international obligations which are expressed in the investment agreement. A first methodological challenge lies in the fact that there is no international organization informed by Asian states of their international treaties. Also, not all Asian governments publish the results of their negotiations. As a result, one the contributions of the current paper is to provide a mapping of these Asian practices based on a survey on the main IIAs databases complemented by national governments' sources of information. Asian investment rule-making can be depicted as a three-tier structure reflecting the various levels of involvement of states in treaty negotiations (2.1), which states also tend to increasingly rely on PTAs to regulate investment instead of pure BITs (2.2).
The Three-tier Classification of Asian states
The current section looks at the investment agreements concluded by the 48 ADB members. Finally, a fourth group of Asian states comprises the frontrunners; these are the States that have concluded more than 40 IIAs. This group is made of Thailand, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Republic of Korea, Peoples' Republic of China. It is on this group of countries that most of our microanalysis will be based. Logically, the great number of IIAs they have concluded reflects a very active investment diplomacy, and this also means that there is bound to be a great number of third states that have granted rights to a great number of foreign investors. 
The increasing use of preferential trade agreements
Another trend worth mentioning is the increasing role of PTAs in Asian investment rule-making. An exhaustive view of all IIAs concluded among Asian states can also help us to understand an important feature of Asian investment rule-making, namely, the rise of PTA to regulate investment matters. In total, 21 Asian PTAs with investment chapters have been concluded since 2001 and notified to the WTO. It is a relatively significant list of PTAs which promotes FDI liberalization and ensures FDI protection throughout key economies such as Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. One observes that PTAs seem to be the favorite legal instruments of Asian capital-exporting states to regulate FDI, as opposed to classic BITs. Among these PTAs, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement has a specific position since it regulates FDI in ten states which aim at creating a common market by 2015. 25 Another important feature is put in evidence by Of course, the number of PTAs covering investment matters remains limited compared to Asian BITs. However, the trend tells us that a growing number of Asian states are willing to negotiate trade and investment in the same document. Such broad treaties may of course be more difficult and longer to negotiate than classical BITs. However, they are also likely to produce greater economic impacts and benefits since both trade and investment are liberalized at the same time.
While the current paper focuses on existing data, it is important to underscore the important number of PTAs currently under negotiation which regulate FDI. The TPP but also RCEP or the Triangular China, Korea, Japan treaties offer good examples and probably validate the idea that the future regulation of investment will take the form of widely encompassing PTAs rather than narrow BITs.
Mapping the share of investment claims against Asian states
The last decade has witnessed an exponential surge of investment disputes between foreign investors and host country governments, and this illustrates the popularity of investment litigation at international level (3.1). Arbitral panels have been charged with the task of applying the rules of IIAs in specific cases, a task not often straightforward given the broad and sometimes ambiguous terms of these arrangements. This new phenomenon of investment litigation has brought about a number of decisions from different arbitral fora, contributing to investment law regimes by giving meaning to their provisions. 26 The cumulative number of treaty-based cases had risen to more than 400 by 2013, with more than 200 brought before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and this paper will detail the statistics for Asian states (3.2).
Investor-state dispute settlement options
In principle, foreign investors may choose to initiate legal proceedings in the domestic courts of the host country, i.e., a right they never lose. Alternatively, they may initiate international arbitration proceedings that can be more favorable to them: this is because it is easier to know international law and practice and because international tribunals are not subject to domestic political pressure. 27 Should investors face discrimination in a state with a weak legal order, it is possible to initiate international arbitration proceedings as a priority. International arbitration is the process by which neutral arbitrators settle disputes concerning bilateral IIAs between sovereign states and foreign investors. 28 In order to ensure a proper respect and conformity with investment rules regarding protected foreign investments, investment treaties provide various dispute resolution mechanisms, "one of the most important of which is international investorstate arbitration which entitles an injured investor to sue the host government for damages because of a violation of treaty standards and rights". 29 On the basis of these provisions, disputes between an investor and a host state are settled by international arbitration rather than by the domestic courts of the host state (as would otherwise be the case). The host government's consent to the jurisdiction of an international arbitration tribunal is granted ex ante in the form of an open offer either in the investment treaty or in its national law. 30 During the past few years investment disputes brought before international arbitrators have multiplied and have raised attention by reason of the significant compensations which host states have in some instances had to pay. . 28 In order to avoid multiple proceedings on the same matter, however, IIAs often establish that once a dispute has been brought to one forum -or, in some cases, a decision has been reached -the dispute may not be pursued in another venue. M.C.I. v. Ecuador holds that the "fork-in-the-road" rule is different from the lis pendens rule because the former rule refers to an option, expressed as a right to choose irrevocably between different jurisdictional systems; once the choice has been made there is no possibility of resorting to any other option. The right to choose once is the essence of the "fork-in-the-road" rule. Most Asian IIAs further allow the foreign investors to choose the venue for the arbitration. Adhoc arbitration allows the parties to agree on the procedural rules to the dispute, although states commonly rely on the established UNCITRAL arbitration rules. The parties may also resort to organizations that provide a venue and have developed their own arbitral procedures. The ICSID, established in 1967 under the umbrella of the World Bank, and which specializes in investorstate disputes, has received the most attention, 32 totalling well over half the investor-state claims brought today. 33 For the most part, IIAs feature more than one option for international arbitration. Most IIAs allow resorting to ICSID, and to ad-hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. Some agreements additionally allow the claim to be brought in other institutions, such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or the International Chamber of Commerce.
Investor-(Asian) state arbitration
As a first effort, the current paper collected all the cases brought against Asian states. The results are significant since for the period from 1987 to the present, at least 83 investment disputes have involved 24 Asian states as defending parties. It is a relatively significant number of disputes, and they amount to almost 20% of all international investment litigation. Further scrutiny reveals that a great variety of states have faced such claims (Figure 6 ). India has had to face 12 claims, whereas Pakistan (8), Georgia (7), Turkmenistan (6), Indonesia (5), Uzbekistan (5) follow with an already substantive experience of investment litigation. In order to complement this initial picture, a further look is needed at the possible relation between the negotiation of treaties and the number of investment disputes. It is especially necessary to understand why India has had to face so many claims, whereas China, which has more IIAs, has only once been challenged.
Investigating the Asian trends in Investor-state Arbitration
In order to understand the trends and hence to give meaning to the current developments, this section looks at four key parameters. Firstly, the evolution over time of the investment claims made against Asian states (4.1). Secondly, the analysis of the quality of national investment treaties is important because it provides a clearer view of the likely impact of the investment treaties. 34 In an earlier publication, it was explained that not all investment treaties are drafted in the same manner; this is because many of their provisions may vary in a significant manner regarding their scope of application and likely economic impact (4.2). 35 Thirdly, the other specific parameters that explain why Indonesia and Thailand have so far encountered a relatively low number of claims are reviewed (4.3). Eventually, the case of China is further analyzed (4.4).
The recent acceleration of investment litigation against Asian States
In order to provide a finer analysis of the litigation involving Asian states, the current section looks at the evolution over time since the very first claim made against Sri Lanka in 1987 to the present claims made against Kazakhstan. The results of the survey covering 83 claims against 24 states 36 appear in Figure 7 . However, since 1987 a growing number of states (24 in total) have been challenged by international arbitration. More importantly, if only an average of four claims a year was initiated from the early 2000s to 2010, there was a sharp increase in 2011. In 2011 and 2012 more than ten disputes were initiated. It is expected that 2013 will be another rich year, with eight disputes already as of August, 2013. It is of course risky to predict the future but one can understand that litigation requires instruments, the knowledge of these instruments and a significant volume of FDI. These three parameters are now satisfied in most Asian states.
"While the treaties continue to govern the same key aspect of investment, they have morphed over the 40 year period to include different types of clauses. We need to take into account the heterogeneity in order to
• Indeed, as earlier explained, most Asian states have entered into investment treaties over the last few years and are expanding their network of IIAs. All these new agreements are the instruments which, soon, will lead to more litigation.
• Equally importantly are the knowledge of the treaties which relate to the private practice and the legal education on investment matters. There is no wide study and measure of such knowledge but it seems to be a trend in many Asian-based law firms to develop an "arbitration" department and for many universities to establish programs on investment regulation. These developments can only nurture the capacity of investors to rely on expert legal advice to bring claims before arbitration against Asian states.
• The regular increase of foreign investment into Asian economies is also important. By definition, there were fewer disputes in the early 2000s in Asia because the volume of FDI was lower. It is because FDI is increasing that the likelihood of having to face claims is becoming more significant.
These three parameters have to be combined to understand the prospects for litigation against Asian states. They actually reveal a great potential which hitherto has been ignored or marginalized. However, the current paper shows that investor-state arbitration is developing fast in Asia, and it predicts an intense practice in the coming years.
The variations over the quality of ISDS provisions
The following table ( The BITsel Index 37 provides an extremely detailed support for understanding national treaty practices. 38 The data for the Top 6 Asian litigators have been extracted to shed some light on the substance and quality of these respective treaties. The results are stunning because the strongest average quality indicator goes to India and Turkmenistan (1.82), which are far more significant than those of states with relatively weaker investment treaties, such as Indonesia (1.57) and China (1.58). These average values are based on a relatively high number of treaties and confirm the significant gap among the Top 6 in terms of rule-making: not all Asian investment treaties are similar. India is inclined to grant significant rights to foreign investors, although it has signed fewer treaties than China has. Conversely, China has signed a large number of treaties but its average quality is among the poorest of the Top 6.
Of course, these averages also depend on the partner states. Treaties are by definition the result of negotiations and reflect the consensus that the two sides reached after exchanging their goals and ambitions. In this connection, this paper will take a closer look at the BITsel and see which treaties for each country of the Top 6 are at the extreme of national practice.
In the case of China, the treaty with the highest quality was concluded with Germany (1.90). This confirms the fact that China truly entered a new generation of investment treaties (with greater rights and access to ISDS) only after 2005, and the treaty with Germany represents a milestone. At the other extreme, China concluded a series of relatively weak treaties with Bulgaria, Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica. One can further fine-tune the analysis and note that there is a significant difference between its IIAs concluded before and after 2005. In the wake of the China-Germany BIT, China further negotiated treaties which were rather more favorable to foreign investors. This generation provides broader and more substantive obligations in regard to the treatment of foreign investment. After the establishment of national treatment -albeit with sectoral reservations in some cases -no substantial restrictions on the ability of foreign investors to challenge the host country's measures in international arbitration are now standard in this category. China's "new-generation" BITs concluded since the beginning of this century seem to be in this category. As a result, these post-2005 IIAs obtain a score of 1.65 whereas before that turning point it was only 1.55. India, on the contrary, concluded more than a dozen treaties with rather high quality (for instance with Switzerland and Mauritius) after it reached the value of 1.90. But it also signed a relatively weak-quality treaty with Mexico (1.63). As for Indonesia, it ranks fourth among the Asian states in terms of the number of investment treaties. However, it has a rather low average quality. In this light, it is interesting to note that the Germany-Indonesia treaty provides a very high level of protection (1.90), much higher than the Indonesian average. However, on the other hand, the Indonesia-Denmark treaty offers the example of a rather weak treaty (1.27). Last but not least, Malaysia, whose economic policy is deeply intertwined with 37 BITs enshrine a series of obligations on the parties to ensure a stable and favorable business environment for foreign investors. These obligations pertain to the treatment that foreign investors are to be afforded in the host country by the domestic authorities. But, meanwhile, such "treatment" that encompasses many sorts of laws, regulations and practices from public entities also affects foreign investors or their investments to a significant extent. In light of the great number of BITs in which different provisions and their different wordings would give birth to a broad kaleidoscope of legal obligations and hence regulatory effects, the "BIT Selection" (BITSel) Index, which is based on the 11 most important elements is found in most of the existing BITs. politics, has concluded a rather strong treaty with Saudi Arabia (1.81). However, the treaty of Malaysia-Lebanon scores poorly (1.36).
The next step is to calculate the "coefficient of variation", 39 which is a better measure of the heterogeneity. The number itself expresses the relation of the standard deviation (a measure for the dispersion of the data) to their mean. If the coefficient of variation is lower than 0.5, the mean value is a good representation for all data. For example, Malaysia's is 0.29. What does it tell us? As it is 0.29 on average for Malaysia, it means that its variation in the provisions is 29%. As all the coefficients of variation are well below 0.5 for each BIT of Malaysia, the mean is a good representation for all the single BIT provisions. What does the coefficient of variation say in comparison to other states? The one for China is 0.31, so the heterogeneity of BITs is slightly larger for Chinese BITs than for Malaysian BITs. While the mean value of each country tells us how investor-friendly their BITs provisions are, the coefficient of variation tells us how heterogeneous they are.
Finally, the BITsel ISDS Quality Indicator represents the Average across ISDS provisions for all BITs in force. An investor-state dispute mechanism is an incentive to invest because it provides as an ultimate resort access to international (neutral) jurisdiction. In the BITsel Index, if such a mechanism is included in the BIT, it can be expected to have a positive effect on FDI flows, but if it is subject to conditions, the effect is expected to be less. The ISDS procedures can however be subject to conditions. Possible condition: Foreign investors must refer the dispute to an administrative review procedure in accordance with domestic law in the first place, and if the dispute still exists three months after the investor has brought the issue to the review procedure, he or she can submit the dispute to international arbitration. 40 At this stage, it is important to mention two lessons. Firstly, there is a significant discrepancy not only between Asian treaty practices but also between individual treaty practices. Secondly, it also underlines the need to look more carefully at the key provisions found in each investment treaty, such as ISDS. Clearly, India has granted a relatively easier access to ISA than China has: the former obtains a coefficient of 2.00 whereas China has the lowest of all Asian states with 1.30. 39 The key advantage of the coefficient of variation is that it is directly comparable between countries. If we have a coefficient of variation of country A, say 30%, and of country B, say 60%, we can say that the heterogeneity of country B is twice as large as that of country A. 40 Possible Condition: If the issue has been brought to a Chinese court, investors must be able to withdraw the case according to domestic law. Otherwise, they cannot submit the dispute to international arbitration. This rule of socalled "fork in the road" requires the investor to make a choice between submission to a domestic court or to international arbitration, and where the choice once made becomes final and irreversible. J. R. 
The Tribunal lacks jurisdiction: explaining the "trompe l'oeil"
In general terms, Asian investments agreements, like the majority of BITs, do not provide entry rights to foreign investors into their territory ( Table 2) . Only a very limited number of IIAs, such as the Japan-Thailand PTA and the Indonesia-Japan PTAs, provide establishment rights. Most Asian BITs provide only a best-endeavour provision in regard to the admission of foreign investments (see the India-China BIT). Such IIAs follow the well-known admission clause model which allows the host country to apply any admission and screening mechanism for foreign investment which it may have in place and therefore determine the conditions on which foreign investment will be allowed to enter the country. In this case, in order to receive the protection of a bilateral investment treaty, the disputed investments have to be in conformity with the host state's laws and regulations, but usually investments in the host state will only be excluded from the protection of the treaty if they have been made in breach of the fundamental legal principles of the host country. 41 Furthermore, in White v. India, having regard to the views of commentators, it was noted that "encourage and promote" provisions are generally not seen to give rise to substantive rights (and they hold in any event that the specific obligations contended for by the claimant are not supported by the provision's general wording). "1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory."
Pre-establishment right
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Among the Asian IIAs adopting the admission clause, some of them deserve a special mention in the way that they define the investment covered by the treaty because it has a significant impact on litigation. Indeed, a significant proportion of the small number of investment claims advanced against Asian states to date has failed on the question of jurisdiction involving a precondition of this sort. For instance, in Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar it was noted that the 1987 ASEAN Agreement requires that the investment must be "specifically approved in writing and registered by the host country and upon such conditions as it deems fit for the purposes of this Agreement", and also it was found that if a state unequivocally and without reservation approves in writing a foreign investment proposal under its internal law, that investment must be taken to be registered and approved also for the purposes of the Agreement. 43 Further illustrations are given by, for instance, Gruslin v. Malaysia 44 and Fraport v. Philippines. 45 Such claims are taken into account in this paper's data, but they resulted only in an award on jurisdiction and not on the merits. These cases represent a specific kind of investment litigation which could be seen as a "forced perspective" on case law involving Asian states as they cannot result in any violation.
As it can be seen from Table 3 above, when it comes to Asian IIAs practice (e.g., the Indonesia -Thailand BIT and the Taiwan-Thailand BIT), some states -Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia -delineate the operation of substantive investment treaty protections by reference to compliance with an element of domestic law regulating the entry of foreign investment. Thailand, for instance, often obliges foreign investors to show that they have been granted specific approval (see Thailand-Indonesia) which can, in extreme cases, explicitly require an approval in writing by a competent authority (see Thailand-Taiwan); this considerably reduces the chances that an investment will be protected by the BIT and hence increase the generation of litigation.
Without clear proof of compliance with this one discrete element across a possible spectrum of entry conditions, foreign investment will not be protected by the BIT. An affirmative act of approval in writing is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for conferring treaty protection. This mechanism allows a state to calibrate its investment treaty exposure to the approval (which will often take the form of registration) of foreign investment under domestic law. It also explains why states such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, which have concluded a high number of IIAs, have not been subject to a high number of claims (see Table 2 above). As a matter of fact, although Malaysia has concluded more IIAs than India or Pakistan, it has not faced much litigation, partly because of the requirement of a written approval. 
Deconstructing China's paradox
Very often, commentators on China's investment policy focus on the number of Chinese investment agreements. It is true that China has concluded a great number of such instruments. However China has faced only one claim to date. It has been said that foreign Awards would be difficult to be enforced in China which, however, a statement made on old Chinese Supreme Court interpretation, largely irrelevant today. As explained by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Director in Boston, "an award made by an ICSID tribunal should be enforced without impediments and the enforcement of a foreign BIT award may also be realized." 46 Also frequently heard, the cultural argument is invoked to explain that China would be averse to litigation. It may probably play a role, or there are other possible ways for foreigners to deal with Chinese authorities. However, there are technical explanations for the Chinese paradox in having a great number of treaties but only one dispute to date. The BITsel quality indicator reveals that China has a very low coefficient of 1.58. This relatively weak protection granted to foreign investors means that the Chinese IIAs do not provide strong protection. If the protection is not strong, it also means that the host state responsibility is rather limited, thereby offering few opportunities for a claim. On top of this, China's BITsel ISDS Quality Indicator is also extremely low (1.30) compared with all other Asian states. It means that Chinese ISDS clauses are full of restrictions which do not easily allow investors to bring claims before arbitration. A careful reading of the BITsel quality indicator and the BITsel ISDS Quality Indicator can only result in the conclusion that most Chinese IIAs are not likely to generate litigation. The reasons are legal and technical.
Traditionally, China has restricted unilateral consent to arbitration to disputes on the amount of compensation to be granted in cases of expropriation. 47 Controversies on other matters, such as the existence of expropriation itself, or breaches of treatment obligations, were to be settled in domestic courts, or could be submitted to arbitration by mutual consent of the investors and national authorities (e.g., China-Korea BIT, Art. 9.3). 48 A number of IIAs require the foreign investor to fulfill certain procedural requirements prior to filing the arbitration claim. The most usual procedural restrictions pertain to waiting periods 49 and the exhaustion of local remedies.
These types of requirements are commonly found in Sino-foreign BITs. 51 Prior to the launch of arbitration, foreign investors must hold negotiations with China's authorities with a view to reaching an amicable settlement. Should these negotiations fail to bring the parties to a commonly agreed solution within a six-month period, the investor may bring the claim to international arbitration. While the majority of Sino-foreign BITs require a six-month waiting period, a few agreements require somewhat shorter periods -three months: BITs with the Netherlands (2001), Germany (2003), and Finland (2004) -or, exceptionally, no waiting period at all in the case of Ghana (1989) . The exhaustion of local remedies requires foreign investors to seek relief to their claim through domestic procedures before bringing the international dispute. Commonly, the investors would be required to file the claim before the competent domestic court. Should the domestic court fail to settle the dispute, or fail to reach a decision within a given period of time, the investor could be entitled to launch the international proceedings. 52 New-generation Sino-foreign IIAs are instead free of the substantial restriction, granting unilateral consent to disputes concerning all disciplines of the agreement. 53 Only these new and recent IIAs are likely to generate litigation before IS on their own or through the application of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) clauses in the wake of the Maffezini jurisprudence. Indeed, several Tribunals have applied MFN clauses to relieve claimants of having to comply with a "prior recourse" obligation. 54 However, some other Tribunals and arbitrators which have rejected attempts to apply MFN clauses to relieve claimants of having to comply with a "prior recourse" obligation 55 have created a schism across awards which may well become an issue when further exploring China's IIAs.
Conclusion
First of all, a comment must be made on investment arbitration provisions as for the current investment treaties negotiated. In the TPP context, Australia has also rejected investor-state dispute settlement in the TPP and the question which arises here is how far that view will influence the other TPP parties. Australia is trying to persuade some TPP members to do away with ISDS in the investment chapter. The reason for doing so, according to Australia, is that ISDS is not an important factor to secure FDI into TPP states and they confirm this through an independent study. This is an interesting issue for the developing member of the TPP to seriously consider and they probably need to do a study to confirm or to rebut what Australia is saying. 56 It is too early to say that Australia's change in policy has immediately affected other states.
57
The analysis conducted in this paper has been aimed at providing a primary analysis of investment litigation against Asian states. All investment agreements concluded by at least one Asian country have been reviewed and contributed to various aspects of the analysis. The developments which are taking place show that Asian states are increasingly negating IIAs (in the form of BITs or PTAs) which form a dense network of obligations. Although, few cases were brought against Asian states by 2009, the pattern has changed since 2010, with a sharp increase over the last three years.
Although some IIAs (for instance, those concluded by China before 2005 or by Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia which require the pre-approval of investments) have generated few disputes for technical reasons, it is rather predictable that Asian states are currently entering an era in which foreign investors are likely to multiply claims. Such a trend requires host states to be prepared to litigate while assessing the benefits of current investment treaties negotiations with, for instance, the EU, the US and Canada.
In this connection, the principle of MFN treatment is of paramount importance to the Asian investment regime as it may create opportunities for investors against these states that have developed rather restrictive provisions. Equally important in terms of future litigation, the more a country has IIAs, the more MFN might play an important role in the future. Malaysia, China and Vietnam are, in this regard, the Asian states that should pay the greatestattention to MFN since the three have already granted rights to a great number of their party investors and investments. 56 Much of the debate regarding the ISDS provisions of the KORUS FTA is viewed as more an outgrowth of political posturing prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections that are looming next year rather than of legal or economic argument. But the developments in Korea have potentially lasting effects throughout our (Asia-Pacific) region and beyond (especially in the context of Japan joining TPP negotiations). 57 In any case, one wonders what the alternative to ISDS should be. ISDS aimed to take these cases out of the (arbitrary) political realm of diplomatic protection on the one hand, and out of (non-neutral) domestic courts on the other. Everyone would agree that the ISDS process has deficiencies, and that the substantive rules it applies need refinement, but one would prefer to improve it rather than to abandon it.
